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CHANGING VIEW OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Spencer Weber Waller*
Noel J. Byrne"
I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between intellectual property and compe-
tition law is often a baffling one. Both fields use similar vocab-
ularies in order to achieve very different ends. The two fields
overlap, but often work at cross-purposes as the exclusivity
inherent in the acquisition and exploitation of intellectual
property rights is incompatible with certain visions of the pro-
motion of competition through the antitrust laws of the United
States of America and the competition provisions of the Euro-
pean Community.'
The complex and evolving relationship between these two
bodies of law bears close study for several reasons. Both bodies
of law have strong political and historical traditions and they
both must be enforced in a way which gives coherent meaning
rather than unintelligible conflict when they overlap. In a
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Associate Director,
Brooklyn Law School Center for the Study of International Business Law; J.D.
Northwestern University Law School, B.A. University of Michigan.
** Senior Fellow, Intellectual Property Unit, Centre for Commercial Law
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1. As of November 1, 1993, the coming into force of the Treaty of European
Union (TEU) formally changed the name of the European Community to the Eu-
ropean Union. See TREATY OF EUROPEAN UNION [TEU] art. A, reprinted in 1
C.M.L.R. 719 (1992). For reason of convenience to an American audience and be-
cause many of the papers refer to events and decisions prior to the TEU, we will
continue with the older usage throughout this introduction and symposium except
where otherwise noted.
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modern global economy, both bodies of law play a vital role in
the enhancement of competition and competitiveness in nation-
al and international markets and the continued liberalization
of international trade. The treatment of intellectual property
and competition issues in the United States and the European
Community from a comparative perspective also brings a spe-
cial insight into the different goals of each legal system and
how both use legal doctrine to achieve those goals.
II. THE VIEw FROM THE UNITED STATES
The United States Constitution provides the basis for both
patent and copyright law.2 The trademark laws of the United
States are scarcely any younger, dating back to the early com-
mon law of the republic and an act of Congress in 1871. The
commitment to the preservation of competition through the
antitrust laws dates back more than a century,4 and is fre-
quently described as a "charter of freedom" of nearly constitu-
tional dimensions5 and the "magna carta" of free enterprise.'
A. The Case Law Unfolds
From the very beginning of the enforcement of the
Sherman Act, and later the Clayton' and Federal Trade Com-
mission Acts,8 United States antitrust law has been defined by
the willingness of the courts as well as the Justice Department
and the Federal Trade Commission to view competition in
terms of a tension with the rights conferred by the intellectual
property laws. Whether by design or as a result of the litiga-
tion strategy of the early antitrust defendants, the Supreme
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. The first federal trademark law was the Trademark Act of 1871, ch. 230,
16 Stat. 198 (1871). This Act was declared unconstitutional in United States v.
Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 97 (1879). Subsequently, the Trademark Act of 1881, ch.
138, 21 Stat. 502 (1881) was enacted. The trademark laws are now codified in 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1150 (1988).
4. The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890. The current version of the statute
can be found in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221
(1940); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933); see
also Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (antitrust as "char-
ter of economic liberty").
6. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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Court defined key antitrust doctrine in a series of cases involv-
ing restrictions imposed on the use and licensing of intellectual
property rights. The Court rejected most of the proffered de-
fenses based on intellectual property rights as a justification
for inherently anticompetitive market behavior and typically
held that the defendants' behavior was per se unreasonable.
The Supreme Court has rejected the exploitation of intellectual
property rights as a defense for otherwise unlawful price fix-
ing,9 market division,' ° monopolization," resale price main-
tenance, 2 and tying. 3
One area that has remained reasonably free from contro-
versy is the use of intellectual property rights as a cover for
collusion among competitors. In judging such cases, the courts
look beyond the labels applied by the parties and condemn
licensing agreements which are mere shams for otherwise
unlawful agreements between competitors. 4
The application of the Sherman Act to foreign commerce
also was established in key cases invalidating cartel agree-
ments which were cloaked in the guise of licensing arrange-
ments, patent pools, and joint ventures involving the exploita-
tion of intellectual rights. In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States,5 the Supreme Court held unlawful a joint ven-
ture and licensing agreement between partially affiliated Unit-
ed States, British, and French manufacturers of antifriction
roller bearings. As part of the licensing of the "Timken" trade-
mark, the parties had agreed to allocate territories, fix prices
on the goods manufactured under the trademark, cooperate in
the enforcement of each manufacturer's territory against other
competitors, and participate in a cartel restricting the imports
and exports of bearings to and from the United States. 6 The
9. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948). But see United States v.
General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
10. See Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990).
11. See Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637
(1947); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
12. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
13. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917).
14. See, e.g., Palmer, 498 U.S. at 46 (price fixing and division of markets
under guise of licensing agreement is per se unreasonable).
15. 341 U.S. 593 (1951), modifying 83 F. Supp. 284, 306 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
16. Id. at 595-96.
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Timken Court rejected the argument that these restrictions
were "reasonable" or "ancillary" to a legitimate joint venture or
licensing agreement. 7 The Court further rejected the notion
that structuring a cartel as a "joint venture" or "license" would
bestow any antitrust 'immunity for such an agreement.1
8
Rather, the Court held that the trademark licenses were sec-
ondary to the real purpose of allocating territories among com-
petitors. 9 The Court further noted that the restrictions im-
posed went far beyond those implicit in the trademark act,
since the parties set price and territorial terms for the sale of
non-trademarked bearings."
Similarly, in United States v. National Lead Co.,2 the
court prohibited a series of restrictive licensing agreements
between competitors which were not ancillary to any legitimate
underlying agreement. The court focused on the fact that the
licenses included terms that were beyond the scope of the pat-
ent grant, indefinite in nature and duration, and applied to as
yet ungranted patents." The court ultimately concluded that
the licenses were merely part of a broader agreement in re-
straint of trade.23
Finally, in United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co.,24
the Supreme Court condemned a cross-licensing agreement
between Singer, e. .. dominant United States sewing machine
manufacturer, and two competing European manufacturers.
The Court held that the purpose and effect of the agreement
was to restrict entry by competing Japanese manufacturers
and to facilitate the continued division of world markets be-
tween the parties.25
17. Id. at 597.
18. Id. at 597-98.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 598-99; see also United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114
(S.D. Ohio 1954), affd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (division of territories
involving trademark license).
21. 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), affd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
22. Id. at 523-24.
23. Id. at 532; see also Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386
(1945) (maintenance of monopoly power through complex series of licensing agree-
ments); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949) (prohib-
iting licensing schemes to implement unlawful cartel and market division agree-
ments); accord United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
24. 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
25. Id. at 194-97; accord Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395
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B. Enforcement Policy Changes
Over the years, the attitude of the Justice Department as
to the proper relationship between intellectual property rights
and competition law has varied dramatically, often leading to
confusion and a pronounced gap between the legal doctrine and
the enforcement policies of the government. From the begin-
ning of World War I to the conclusion of World War II, United
States antitrust policy fluctuated wildly in. terms of its atti-
tudes and enforcement posture towards combinations between
competitors, the desirability of large powerful firms, and the
use of intellectual property rights to achieve these objec-
tives." It was not until World War II that the Sherman Act
was used aggressively to attack international and foreign car-
tels and their accompanying licensing practices. Only then did
the hostility to intellectual property rights become a consistent
feature of United States antitrust policy. This hostility to-
ward the acquisition and exploitation of intellectual property
rights on competition law grounds continued into the late
1970s, despite controversy regarding the wisdom of this policy,
both in the United States and abroad.
That hostility culminated in two key developments in
United States antitrust law during the 1970s. First, a 1975
lunch speech by an official of the Antitrust Division received
widespread attention by announcing the "Nine No-Nos" of
licensing which would result in the almost certain challenge
of the license on antitrust grounds. 9 Second, the Carter
U.S. 100 (1969) (condemning patent pool designed to exclude imports into Canadi-
an market and facilitate continued division of international markets); Hartford-
Empire Co., 323 U.S. at 386 (licensing agreement as part of scheme to monopo-
lize); United States v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp. 118 (N.D. Ill. 1956)
(horizontal territorial allocation under guise of licensing agreement condemned).
26. See generally TONY FREYER, REGULATING BIG BuSINESS: ANTITRUST IN
GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA 1880-1990, at 159-232 (1992).
27. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1952); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949);
United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
29. The official stated that the Justice Department would prosecute as per se
antitrust violations any of the following restrictions in a licensing agreement:
1) requiring a licensee to purchase unpatented materials from the
licensor;
2) requiring a licensee to assign any patent which may be issued
after the licensing arrangement is executed;
1993]
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administration published the 1977 Antitrust Guide for Interna-
tional Operations which expressed more formally the
administration's hostility toward restrictive licensing arrange-
ments. 0
C. The Current Posture
Four principal factors led to dramatic change over the past
seventeen years. First, United- States antitrust doctrine itself
began to change. In the landmark decision, Continental T.V.,
inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,"1 the Supreme Court announced
that nonprice vertical restraints between firms at different
levels of production would no longer be treated as per se unrea-
sonable. Instead, such agreements would be examined under a
very broad rule of reason test which balances the effects of any
restrictions on intrabrand competition with the procompetitive
effects of restricted distribution on interbrand competition.32
Following Sylvania, the lower courts began to look with favor
on such vertical restraints, except in those limited circum-
stances where the defendant had substantial market power
and could not come forward with any plausible procompetitive
justification.33 Most licensing agreements came to benefit
from this change as the courts now tend to view them as
3) attempting to restrict a purchaser of a patented product in the
resale of that product;
4) restricting a licensee's freedom to deal in the products or services
not within the scope of the patent;
5) agreeing not to license other persons without the licensee's con-
sent;
6) requiring mandatory package licenses;
7) requiring royalties in an amount not reasonably related to the
actual sales covered by the patent;
8) placing restrictions on the sale of products made by the use of a
patented process; and
9) requiring resale price maintenance for the sale of the patented
products of the licensee.
Bruce Wilson, Department of Justice Luncheon Speech, Law on Licensing Prac-
tices: Myth or Reality? (Jan. 21, 1975), in Abbot B. Lipsky, Current Antitrust Divi.
sion Views on Patent Licensing Practices, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 515, 518-24 (1981).
30. Antitrust Division, Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for International
Operations 1977, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) % 13,110 (1988).
31. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
32. Id. at 57-59.
33. See, e.g., Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th
Cir. 1983); Cowley v. Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980).
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vertical in nature, except in the limited circumstances where
such arrangements appear to be a disguise for collusion be-
tween competitors.34
Second, a growing movement has questioned whether an
intellectual property right alone confers any meaningful mar-
ket power within the meaning of United States antitrust law.
Older Supreme Court decisions making the automatic link
between the presence of intellectual property rights and mar-
ket power have been questioned by a growing number of Jus-
tices.35 Lower courts have begun to follow the lead of these
bold dissenters on issues like the legality of tying by firms
with intellectual property rights. 6 One court even went so far
as to find that a law firm committed legal malpractice by not
seeking jury instructions on a theory of tying -that had never
been accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court. Congress
also contributed to this trend by amending the patent laws in
1988 to make proof of patent misuse involving tying congruent
with the antitrust laws in requiring the proof of market power
as a requirement of misuse. 8
Third, the protection and exploitation of intellectual prop-
erty rights both domestically and abroad has become a critical
part of the United States trade policy, as the United States
international trade patterns have shifted away from manufac-
turing towards the export of services and the licensing of tech-
nology. The United States has made the enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights a top priority through various disparate
policy initiatives. These include the strengthening of the intel-
lectual property laws through statutory amendments, 9 the
34. Even horizontal licensing agreements have been held to be lawful under a
full rule of reason analysis where there was a plausible gain in efficiency and
consumer welfare from the agreement. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
35. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 38 n.7
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. See Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988); A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc.,
806 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986).
37. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Lewis, Overbeck & Furman, 979 F.2d 546 (7th Cir.
1992).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1988).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (1988); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988); 35 U.S.C. §
105 (Supp. II 1990); 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1988); Trademark Counterfeit Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2178 (1984).
1993]
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creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to
handle the appeals of intellectual property matters on a na-
tionwide and uniform basis,40 the vigorous use of section 337
of the Trade Act of 1930 to exclude imports infringing United
States intellectual property rights,4 the conditioning of trade
concessions on the enforcement of intellectual property rights
by the recipient nations,42 and the threat and use of section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a unilateral measure to inves-
tigate and retaliate against foreign governmental practices
which injure United States intellectual property rights.4" In-
tellectual property rights also have been the driving force be-
hind United States negotiating strategies in the GATT,44 the
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement,45 the North
American Free Trade Agreement,46 and bilateral investment
and commercial treaties.
Finally, the Antitrust Division during the Reagan and
Bush administrations became a powerful force in changing
attitudes about the competitive significance of intellectual
property rights. The Nine No-Nos vanished and were replaced
by an attitude of positive praise for the full protections of the
intellectual property rights and the procompetitive benefits of
their full exploitation. These new attitudes were expressed in
articles and speeches, 48 new international guidelines, 49 new
research and development joint venture guidelines, ° the filing
40. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1993).
41. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988). In fact, § 1337 has proved to be such a powerful
weapon that a dispute resolution panel of the GATT found that the law violated
the national treatment provisions contained in Article III of the GATT. See Ken-
neth W. Abbott, International Decision: GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 274, 277-79 (1990).
42. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2462, 2702 (1988); 19 U.S.C. § 3202 (Supp. III 1991).
43. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i) (1988).
44. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, In-
cluding Trade in Counterfeit Goods, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
45. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., art. 2004, 27 I.L.M. 281.
46. North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 15, 1992, arts. 1701-21, 32
I.L.M. 605.
47. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and Sample Provisions from Ne-
gotiated BITs, in 1 BASIC DOCUMIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIc LAv 649-64
(Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds. 1990).
48. See, e.g., Charles F. Rule, The Administration's View: Antitrust Analysis
After the Nine No-Nos, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 365 (1986).
49. Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines
for International Operations-1988, reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 91
13,109 (Nov. 10, 1988).
50. Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Joint Research and Development
[Vol. XX:I
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of amicus briefs in private antitrust litigation, the issuance of
business review letters stating that the Division would not
challenge particular intellectual property arrangements, and
support for innovative legislation that specified that the full
rule of reason applied to research and development joint ven-
tures and provided for the registration of agreements in return
for the detrebling of any damages if the agreement were found
to violate the rule of reason.5'
The schizophrenia between antitrust and intellectual prop-
erty thinking unfortunately will continue for at least another
generation in the United States, regardless of the specific anti-
trust policies adopted by the Clinton administration or any
administrations which follow. The case law is not internally
consistent, judicial views vary widely, enforcement policy
changes on a regular basis, and external events, such as the
trade policy needs of the United States, exert an unyielding
pressure on both antitrust and intellectual property law. Pre-
dictions remain dangerous and the forecast appears cloudy for
the foreseeable future.
III. THE VIEw FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The antitrust laws of the United States of America have
long been an important inspirational source for lawmakers in
other countries wanting to adopt or to reform legislation deal-
ing with monopolies and restrictive trade practices. Among the
economists and lawyers from the founding member states52 of
Ventures-1980, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,121 (Dec. 11, 1984).
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-04 (Supp. 1993). This legislation recently has been ex-
panded to cover production joint ventures as well. National Cooperative Production
Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117 (1993).
52. The founding members of the European Economic Community are Bel-
gium, France, The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Neth-
erlands. The European Community now includes six other member states: England,
Ireland, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, and Greece.
As of the coming into force of the European Economic Area Agreement
(EEAA) on January 1, 1994, the competition rules of the European Union (EU)
will apply throughout the EEA territory. The European Commission has issued
new forms for notifying restrictive agreements. See 1993 O.J. (L336) 1. Under the
EEAA, enforcement of the competition rules will be shared by the Commission and
the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA), under a complex set of rules. In Article
85 cases, TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EC TREA-
TY] art. 85, (Article 53 EEAA), the ESA has jurisdiction when the effects of the
agreements in question are limited to the EFTA countries (Austria, Finland, Ice-
19931
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the European Economic Community who drafted the
Community's rules for competition (Articles 85 through 90) and
the free movement of goods (Articles 30 through 36) or advised
their respective governments on these provisions, were a num-
ber (perhaps a majority) who had studied at famous law
schools in the United States and were very familiar with, and
drew inspiration from, United States antitrust laws. An anti-
trust lawyer from the United States is apt therefore to recog-
nize in the Community's provisions for competition similar, if
not identical, conceptual tools to those employed by United
States antitrust laws. The uninitiated might perceive a close
kinship between the two sets of legislation. However, the same
conceptual tools are used for different ends by the United
States and the European Community. The fundamental pre-
mises underlying Community law differ from the basic philoso-
phy that motivates United States antitrust law.
The United States Attorney General's National Committee
to Study the Antitrust Laws in 1953 stated that "[t]he basic
philosophy of the Sherman Act remains above partisan contro-
versy as a 'charter of freedom,' a constitution governing the
economy of the United States."53 The motive for antitrust poli-
cy is the American mistrust of unchecked power and there is a
"broad consensus that competition among independent private
entrepreneurs is the healthiest basis for industrial and com-
mercial activity."54
There is no such consensus about competition in the Euro-
pean Community. This is reflected in various ways, notably by
the absence of a doctrine of per se illegality of certain restric-
tive practices under the Community's competition rules and
the Commission's power in Article 85(3) to exempt agreements
that restrict or distort competition contrary to Article 85(1).
land, Norway, and Sweden), or if they affect trade between the EU and the EFTA
countries, and, the companies entering into the agreements achieve more than 33%
of their total EEA income from the EFTA countries. Different allocation rules
apply in Article 86 cases, EC TREATY art. 86, (Article 54 and 56(2) EEAA) and
merger cases (Article 57 EEAA). The Commission has jurisdiction in all cases not
specifically assigned to ESA. As a general point, the entry into force of the EEAA
means that business enterprises will need to change the way they do business in
the EFTA countries to comply with EU law. Most EU laws on the internal market
became immediately binding on the EFTA countries on January 1, 1994.
53. A. D. NEALE & D. G. GOYDER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A.: A
STUDY OF COMPETITION ENFORCED BY LAW 440 (3d ed. 1980).
54. Id. at 475.
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The antitrust laws in the United States might condemn re-
strictive trade practices that competition law in the Communi-
ty would tolerate and vice versa.
It is questionable therefore whether, beyond a superficial
level, the legal treatment of particular restrictive trade practic-
es under the different systems in the European Community
and the United States can be compared. This does not negate
the comparative endeavors of legal scholars, but only raises a
caution about how far or deeply a comparison can be pressed
before it ceases to be relevant or valid.
A. Fundamental Goals of the European Community
The Treaty establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity, known as the Treaty of Rome,55 was signed in Rome on
March 25, 1957. The purposes of the Community, as amended
by the Treaty of the European Community, are given in Article
2:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a
common market and an economic and monetary union and by
implementing the common policies or activities referred to in
Articles 3 and 3a, to promote throughout the Community a
harmonious and balanced development of economic activities,
sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the envi-
ronment, a high degree of convergence of economic perfor-
mance, a high level of employment and of social protection,
the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and
economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member
States.#
The activities referred to in Article 3 include the elimina-
tion of quantitative restrictions on the import and export of
goods between member states, all other measures having
equivalent effect, and the creation of a system for ensuring
that competition in the internal market is not distorted. Rules
for the elimination of quantitative restrictions and equivalent
55. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EC TREATY].
56. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, (as amended, most
recently at Maastricht by the Treaty of European Union), Feb 2, 1992, art. 2,
reprinted in THE TREATY OF ROME CONSOLIDATED AND THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT
588 (Neville M. Hannigan & Joe M. Hill eds., 1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY
MAASTRICHT].
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measures are set down in Articles 30 through 36." Compe-
tition rules that apply to undertakings are given in Articles 85
through 90.58 These rules regulate the exercise of intellectual
property, including its exploitation by assignment or license.
Various legislative measures and an extensive jurisprudence
accommodate the enforcement and exploitation of intellectual
property with the corpus of rules designed to eliminate unjusti-
fiable barriers to intra-Community trade.
B. Intellectual Property and Community Law
The power to grant or recognize the existence of intellectu-
al property is a sovereign act. In the European Community,
each member state retains this sovereign power. In other
words, each member state can grant a patent of invention, the
validity of which can be challenged only before its national
courts on the basis of its national law. 9 This can produce a
diverse, complex legal situation, where, for example, patents
for the same invention (parallel patents) expire on different
dates in the member states or where, due to the way patent
claims are interpreted by national courts of the member states,
a parallel patent is enforceable in one member state but not in
another. Moreover, but for the intervention of Community law,
a person holding parallel patents in different member states
could exercise his monopoly rights in each State to exclude
from the market genuine products available in other member
states. That is to say, the patentee could use his discrete na-
tional rights to prevent a common market for the patented
goods from being established. How to reconcile intellectual
property with the concept of a common market envisaged in
Article 2 posed a fundamental problem for the Community.
The European Court of Justice resolved the issue by rul-
ing, early in the life of the Community, that Community law
regulates the exercise of intellectual property, but safeguards
its existence. The different forms of intellectual property avail-
able in the member states exist for different, quite specific
purposes. The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice defines
57. See infra text accompanying notes 62-63.
58. See infra text accompanying note 64 and notes 65-71 and accompanying
text.
59. Even a European patent is a "bundle" of national patents.
[Vol. XX: I
CHANGING VIEW
what the property comprises and, correspondingly, what Com-
munity law safeguards."0 With respect to a patent of inven-
tion, for example, the Court has ruled that in order to reward
the creative effort of the inventor, a patent guarantees the
patentee the exclusive right to use an invention with a view to
manufacturing industrial products and putting them on the
market for the first time, either directly or by the grant of
licenses to third parties.6
C. Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions and Equivalent
Measures: Articles 30 to 36
Where a government, public authority, firm, or private
individual restricts by value or amount the export or the im-
port of goods, or obtains a court order to that effect, this is a
,quantitative restriction. An equivalent measure is virtually
any trading rule, any system of preferment, or any system of
inspection, sanctions, approvals, or court orders, which hin-
ders, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, the flow of
goods in intra-Community trade.
The basic rule may be summarized as follows: goods pro-
duced or available in the Community may be imported or ex-
ported free from unnecessary interference by governments,
public authorities, or private individuals. A member state may
not inhibit, directly or indirectly, the free movement of goods
on the internal market unless the state can justify its interfer-
ence by reference to one or more of the grounds given in Arti-
cle 36, which include public morality, public policy or public
security, protection of health and life of humans, animals or
plants, protection of national treasures possessing artistic,
historic or archaeological value, or the protection of industrial
60. See, e.g., Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon GmbH MbH v. Metro-SB-
Grossmdrkte GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 487, 1971 C.M.L.R. 631 (1971) (copy-
right in sound recordings); Case 187/80, Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981 E.C.R.
2063, 3 C.M.L.R. 463 (1981) (patent of invention); Case 16/74, Centrafarm BV v.
Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183, 2 C.M.L.R. 12 (H.R. 1974) (Neth.) (registered
trademark right); Case C-10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG, 1990 E.C.R.
3711, 3 C.M.L.R. 571 (1990) (registered trademark right); Case 53/87, Consorzio
Italiano v. Regie National des Usines Renault, 1988 E.C.R. 6039, 4 C.M.L.R. 265
(1990) (registered design right); Case 144/81, Keurkoop BV v. Nancy Kean Gifts
BV, 1982 E.C.R. 2853, 2 C.M.L.R. 47 (1983) (registered design right).
61. See, e.g., Case 1674, Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183, 2
C.M.L.R. 12 (H.R. 1974).
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and commercial property.62 Even then, a prohibition or restric-
tion on exports, imports, or goods in transit must not be ap-
plied arbitrarily by the state nor constitute a disguised re-
striction on trade between member states.
In the competitive struggle, intellectual property may be
used to claim or retain market power. It can also be used to
prevent the free movement of goods in trade between member
states. If the owner of a German patent of invention brings an
action for infringement of his patent in the German courts and
obtains a judicial order preventing a product covered by his
patent from being imported into Germany from Holland, this
would result in a measure equivalent to a quantitative restric-
tion. An import ban would be justifiable under Article 36, as
being necessary for the protection of industrial property (the
patent in action), if the product had been made in Holland by
an infringer of the Dutch patent. But if the patented product
was put on the Dutch market by a Dutch licensee of the Ger-
man owner, then the owner could not use his German patent
to keep the product in question out of Germany. Both German
and Dutch patent rights would be exhausted vis-A-vis the par-
ticular product" and a judicial order inhibiting the free move-
ment of this product between member states would not be
justifiable under Article 36.
The rules on the free movement of goods within the Euro-
pean Community are important for parties negotiating con-
tracts for territorial rights there. Articles 30 through 36 limit
the protection that intellectual property can give the licensor
in a territory he reserves for himself or the licensee in a terri-
tory granted exclusively to him by the licensor against protect-
ed products marketed by the other, or indeed by an authorized
third party. When products protected by intellectual property
are placed on the market within the Community by the propri-
etor or by his licensee, the products are released thereby from
the protective rights relating to them ("exhaustion of rights")
and are free to circulate on the Community's internal market.
Any attempt by licensed parties to restrict the circulation of
62. EC TREATY MAASTRICHT, supra note 56, art. 36, at 605 (emphasis added).
63. With regard to goods imported into the European Community from third,
nonmember countries, see Re Patented Bandaging Material, 2 C.M.L.R. 359
(H.O.G. 1988) (F.R.G.).
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such products also may violate the rules on competition in
Articles 85 and 86.
D. Equivalent Measures as Violations of Article 85 or Article
86
In some cases, a measure equivalent to an export or im-
port ban or quota will be caught by the ban on restrictive prac-
tices in Article 85 because it results from an agreement be-
tween undertakings or a concerted practice," or the measure
may constitute the abuse of a dominant position contrary to
Article 86. In such cases, proceedings will be brought under
the competition rules in Articles 85 and/or 86. There is no pro-
vision in Articles 30 through 36 for imposing a fine for a viola-
tion of the free movement rules, though damages may be re-
coverable through an action for breach of a statutory duty, an
abuse of power, or a misfeasance of public office.65 On the oth-
er hand, breaches of the competition rules may attract heavy
fines and leave wrongdoers liable for damages.
A contractual restraint on the free movement of goods
between member states is not justifiable on the ground that
resale in another member state may infringe intellectual prop-
erty rights there. It is not a justifiable measure for the protec-
tion of the intellectual property in question. For example, in
the Bayo-N-Ox decision, Bayer AG, Germany, distributed addi-
tives for animal feedstuffs directly to the feedstuff manufactur-
ers in the Community through local subsidiaries and licens-
ees.6" Bayer initiated an agreement under which its German
customers would use supplies of a particular additive (Bayo-N-
Ox, formulated with the active ingredient "Olaquindox") exclu-
sively for their own feedstuff production in return for reduced
prices. Bayer's aim was to protect its own distribution system
by preventing parallel trade in the product following the expi-
ration of its patent in Germany, before parallel patents in
other countries expired. The company argued that banning the
agreement would undermine its parallel patents for
64. See EC TREATY MAASTRICHT, supra note 56.
65. See, e.g., Bourgoin v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries and Food, 1 C.M.L.R.
267 (C.A. 1986) (Eng.).
66. Commission Decision 90/38 of December 1989 Relating to a Proceeding
Under Art. 85 of the EC TREATY (IV/32.026, Bayo-N-Ox) 1990 J.O. (L 21) 71.
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Olaquindox in the other member states. This argument was
rejected and Bayer was fined heavily. The EC Commission
reiterated the established principle that if the inventor decides
to sell the product in a member state in which patent protec-
tion does not exist or no longer exists for the product, he must
accept the consequences of such a decision in so far as trade
within the Common Market is concerned. The right to defend
oneself in all the member states of the Community in which
patent protection still exists against products of other manu-
facturers that infringe patent law continues without any re-
striction.
E. Restrictions in Technology Licenses and Article 85
Competition, that is, workable competition, is a means to
an end in Community law, not an end in itself. A system for
ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distort-
ed by restrictive agreements between undertakings is set down
in Article 85.7 Subject to the possibility of an exemption pur-
suant to Article 85(3), Article 85(1) prohibits agreements and
concerted practices which may affect trade between member
states and which have the object or effect of preventing, re-
stricting or distorting competition within the Common Market.
It is not enough therefore to show that an agreement between
undertakings restricts or distorts competition in a member
state. A restrictive agreement is prohibited by Article 85 only
to the extent that it is capable of endangering, either directly
or indirectly, in fact or potentially, trade between member
states.
Community competition law has no doctrine of per se legal-
ity, or per se illegality. It has no "rule of reason." Restrictive
terms in a patent license are not immune to the prohibition in
Article 85 only because the restraints in question might be
67. Any consensual arrangement, including an agreement "binding in honor
only" and an "understanding" on a commercial matter, between two or more un-
dertakings will constitute an agreement between undertakings for the purposes of
Article 85(1). An "understanding," if it does not amount to an agreement, may well
develop into a concerted practice. An "undertaking" is any commercial enterprise,
including a sole trader, a partnership and a company with limited liability. But a
subsidiary company which lacks any real autonomy in determining its line of con-
duct on the market and which is integrated with its parent company is not an
'undertaking" for the purposes of Article 85(1).
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said to fall within the "scope of the patent" or could be regard-
ed as being reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward for
the patentee's monopoly. An agreement must be assessed in its
legal and economic context to determine whether, in fact or
probability, the agreement affects interstate trade or restricts
competition to a perceptible degree.6" This means, in the case
of a licensing agreement, that regard must be had to the re-
spective sizes of the undertakings which are parties to the
agreement in question and their respective market shares, the
nature of the product or technology, whether the license is
exclusive or nonexclusive, and the economic context in which
the agreement will be performed, including whether the agree-
ment is part of a network of territorial licenses.
It is beyond the resources of most undertakings, or their
legal advisors, to assess an agreement in the manner required
by Article 85. Undertakings that are prospective parties to a li-
cense will draft the contract so that, if it should fall within
Article 85(1), it will benefit from the block exemption given in
one or another of the regulations on technology licensing agree-
ments.69 These regulations are mutually exclusive, though
similar in structure. Each regulation gives a block exemption
to bilateral, exclusive manufacturing licenses with export bans.
Each lists obligations that are regarded as not caught by Arti-
cle 85(1), or if caught, are exempt. Certain obligations, such as
price fixing and maximum quantity, if included in a licensing
agreement or practiced concertedly by the license parties, will
put the agreement beyond the block exemption. The block
exemption in each regulation does not apply to patent pooling
agreements, joint venture agreements, cross-licenses between
competitors, except where the parties are free from territorial
restraints, pure software licenses, or licensing agreements in
respect of plant breeders' rights. Sub-licenses, assignments for
a royalty, and licensing agreements wherein connected under-
takings assume the rights or obligations of the licensor or the
68. Guidance on this task is given in the Commission's Notice on Agreements
of Minor Importance. This notice is a policy statement, not a legal act or measure
of the Community.
69. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 on the Applica-
tion of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agree-
ments, 1984 J.O. (L 219) 15; Commission Regulation 556/89 of 30 November 1988
on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Know-
How Licensing Agreements, 1989 J.O. (L 61) 1.
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licensee, are expressly included in the regulations. Finally,
each regulation empowers the EC Commission to withdraw the
exemption where, for example, an arbitration award does not
meet the conditions for an exemption laid down in Article
85(3), or if the licensee fails to exploit the lic6nsed patent or
technology adequately.
If an agreement or concerted practice caught by Article
85(1) does not satisfy the conditions for a block exemption, the
EC Commission and the parties must seek either a negative
clearance or an individual exemption pursuant to Article 85(3).
If the EC Commission is not notified, the agreement or con-
certed practice must not be implemented since to do so would
be in violation of Article 85(1).
A block exemption differs from an individual exemption in
that it is based on a general, abstract assessment of one type
of agreement, carried out by the legislature ex ante. This as-
sessment is guided by the probable effects of the category of
agreement under normal conditions of competition. No specific
investigation is carried out into the conditions of Article 85(3),
as must be done before the EC Commission exempts a specific
agreement by decision.
F. Legal Consequences of Violating Article 85
Agreements between undertakings and concerted practices
caught by Article 85(1) are prohibited, and no prior decision to
that effect is required by Community law. The prohibition in
Article 85 is immediate when the probable effect of an agree-
ment between undertakings is an appreciable distortion of
competition within the common market which may affect trade
between member states. An agreement caught by Article 85(1),
but not exempted by decision of the EC Commission or by
regulation, is declared void by Article 85(2). A national court in
the Community may declare an agreement to be incompatible
with Article 85(1), but it cannot exempt the agreement pursu-
ant to Article 85(3). A court can decide whether the agreement
satisfies the conditions for a block exemption given by regula-
tion and may be able to sever from the contract any restrictive
terms that offend Article 85.70 Additionally, money owing to
70. See, e.g., Case 319/82, Soci6t6 de Vente de Ciments et Betons de 1'Est S.A.
v. Kerpen & Kerpen GmbH and Co. KG, 1983 E.C.R. 4173, 1 C.M.L.R. 511 (1983);
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or paid by a party to a contract prohibited by Article 85 might
well be unrecoverable. However, a third party who suffers loss
or damage caused by a prohibited agreement or concerted
practice can sue for the loss and seek an injunction against
continuance of the violation.
G. Intellectual Property and Article 86
The prohibition in Article 85(1) of agreements and concert-
ed practices which prevent, restrict, or distort competition
applies to all markets and all undertakings.7' It is cast in
such general terms that it catches both economically "good"
agreements and agreements without any redeeming features.
It applies to the behavior of all undertakings under normal
conditions of competition and prohibits them from disturbing
effective competition through agreements or concerted practic-
es, but not through unilateral conduct. A correcting mechanism
is provided by Article 85(3), under which agreements having
favorable effects may be exempted from the ban in Article
85(1).
Article 86 is structured differently. It does not apply to all
markets, but only to those markets on which one or more un-
dertakings occupy a dominant position. It is directed only to
undertakings in a dominant position and not to other under-
takings. It only prohibits conduct in the nature of an abuse, al-
though this may be unilateral conduct on the part of a single
undertaking. It protects from further adverse effects compe-
tition which has already been weakened as a result of an un-
dertaking or undertakings having a dominant position. The
fact that Article 85 is applicable to an agreement or concerted
practice does not preclude the application of Article 86 thereto.
Indeed, both Article 85 and Article 86 may be applicable, since
an agreement which falls within Article 85(1) can also consti-
tute the abuse of a dominant position. In other words, Articles
85 and 86 can be applied concurrently where an undertaking
Case 56/65, Soci6t6 Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966 E.C.R.
235, 1966 C.M.L.R. 357 (1966); Chemidus Wavin Ltd. v. Soci~t6 pour la Transfor-
mation et l'Exploitation des Resines Industrielle S.A., 1977 F.S.R. 181 (Eng. C.A.).
71. For a comparison of Articles 85 and 86, see the opinion of Advocate-Gen-
eral Kirschner in Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak Rausing S.A. v. Commission, 1990
E.C.R. 309, 316-46, 4 C.M.L.R. 334 (Ct. First Instance 1990).
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in a dominant position concludes an agreement restricting
competition.72
Intellectual property may assist its proprietor to attain or
maintain a position of market dominance, as in A.B. Volvo v.
Erik Veng (UK) Limited,7" where the proprietor owned design
rights for spare parts for which there are no substitutes, and
held a significant share of the relevant market. In Volvo, the
proprietor of certain registered designs for panel bodies of
motor vehicles refused to license the defendant to import and
sell such panels. Veng imported panels protected by registra-
tion of the designs and manufactured without Volvo's authority
and marketed these panels in the United Kingdom. Volvo sued
Veng for infringement.
One of the questions referred to the European Court of
Justice was whether the proprietor of a registered design in
respect of body work panels should be presumed to be abusing
his dominant position where he refused to grant to third par-
ties a license to supply such body work panels, even though
the third parties were prepared to pay a reasonable royalty for
all the articles sold under that license. The Court accepted the
proposition that if a substantial car manufacturer holds regis-
tered designs which, under the law of a member state, confer
on it the sole and exclusive right to make and import replace-
ment body panels required to effect repair of the body of a car
of its manufacture (and if such body panels are not replaceable
by body panels of any other design), that manufacturer is in a
dominant position within the meaning of Article 86. The manu-
facturer is in a dominant position because the manufacturer
owns the sole and exclusive right and because it is impossible
for the consumer to obtain a substitute product.
An undertaking in a dominant position should behave with
circumspection lest it abuse that position. Classic examples of
abusive behavior are refusing to supply, tying, predatory pric-
ing, and economic discrimination. But a refusal by the propri-
etor to license his intellectual property rights is not in itself
72. See, e.g., Case 395/87, Ministere Public v. Jean Louis Tournier and Jean
Verney, 1989 E.C.R. 2521, 4 C.M.L.R. 248 (1989) (concerning the system of royal-
ties of the French copyright management company SACEM).
73. Case T-30/89, Hilti A.G. v. Commission, 4 C.M.L.R. 16 (Ct. First Instance
1992); Chiron Corp. v. Organon Teknika Ltd. (No.2), 1993 F.S.R. 324 (English
High Court, Patents Court).
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abusive of a dominant position afforded by the right. The right
to prevent and to authorize infringements goes to the very
existence of intellectual property. Community law does not
require the proprietor to license third parties, even in return
for a reasonable royalty. This does not mean however that, in
exercising his intellectual property rights, a proprietor in a
dominant position can behave arbitrarily or fix prices at an
unfair level. If such conduct in the exercise of an exclusive
right by an undertaking in a dominant position in the common
market, or a substantial part of it, is liable to affect trade
between member states, it may constitute an abuse within the
meaning of Article 86.'
A violation of Article 86 may afford a defense to a contrac-
tual action for breach of a licensing agreement or give a cause
of action to a third party for the breach of a statutory duty.
Injunctive relief may be sought by a person whose business is
threatened by a violation of the competition rules.
Taken together, Articles 85 and 86 form a comprehensive
system for the regulation of the competitive implications of the
use and abuse of intellectual property in the European Com-
munity. An analysis of these rules demonstrates many of the
same tensions between the promotion of competition and the
exclusivity inherent in intellectual property rights that is
found in United States antitrust law, but must always be ana-
lyzed in light of the differing fundamental goals of the Commu-
nity.
IV. THE SYMPOSIUM
In order to better analyze the changing developments in
this critical field, a joint symposium was planned and present-
ed by the Brooklyn Law School Center for the Study of Inter-
national Business Law and the Intellectual Property Unit of
the Centre for Commercial Law Studies at Queen Mary and
Westfield College, University of London. This was the third
joint symposium held by Brooklyn Law School and Queen
Mary College and published in the Brooklyn Journal of Inter-
national Law.75 The symposium was conducted in London on
74. See Case 238/87, Volvo v. Erik Veng Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211, 4 C.M.L.R.
122 (1989); Case T-30/89, Hilti A.G. v. EC Commission, 4 C.M.L.R. 16 (Ct. First
Instance 1992).
75. The proceedings of the past joint symposia are printed in International
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November 1, 1993 at the Institute Of Advanced Legal Studies
and on April 15, 1994 in New York City at Brooklyn Law
School. This unique format included the same principal
speakers at each event plus different sets of British and Amer-
ican commentators in London76 and New York City.77
Following introductions as to the competition principles in
the United States and the Economic Community, Professor Leo
Raskind addressed the difficult subject of the United States
antitrust aspects of licensing intellectual property rights and
the changing and conflicting standards for both antitrust and
misuse policy. 78 Ben Smulders of the European Commission
Legal Service then contrasted the European Community view
of restrictions in intellectual property licenses under the Trea-
ty of Rome and the overriding needs of the European Commu-
nity to achieve a single unified market free from artificial
divisions along national lines.79
The focus then turned to the tripartite relationship be-
tween competition, intellectual property, and international
trade principles. Professor Jerome Reichman of Vanderbilt
University Law School continued his work in the international
trade field in analyzing the competitive effects of the existing
forms of intellectual property rules and the gaps in the current
thinking that fail to protect incremental, but commercially
valuable innovation. 0  In the afternoon, David Keeling,
Securities Regulation: Recent Developments in the United States, the United King-
dom, and the European Community, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1-221 (1990) and Tax-
ing the Transfer of Information, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1-86 (1991).
76. Professor Valentine Korah, University College, University of London; Pro-
fessor Gerald Dworkin, Kings College, University of London; Professor Rosa
Greaves, University of Durham; and Alison Firth, Queen Mary and Westfield Col-
lege, University of London, served as commentators on the principal papers at the
London symposium. Professors Korah, Greaves, and Firth were kind enough to
prepare comments in written form which are presented at 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
161, 121 and 157 (1994).
77. Professor Samuel Murumba, Brooklyn Law School, Professor Joel
Reidenberg, Fordham University School of Law,. Professor Eleanor Fox, New York
University School of Law; and Gerald Sobel, Partner, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman,
Hays & Handler, commented on the principal papers in New York City. The publi-
cation deadlines for this special symposium issue did not permit the inclusion of
these comments.
78. Leo J. Raskind, Licensing Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 49 (1994).
79. Ben Smulders, European Community Competition Law and Licensing
Agreements, 20 BROOK. J. INTL L. 25 (1994).
80. Jerome H. Reichman, Beyond the Historical Lines of Demarcation: Competi-
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referendaire to Advocate General Francis Jacobs of the Europe-
an Court of Justice, continued his interest in the fields of com-
petition and intellectual property law by examining the effect
of the European Community rules on the free movement of
goods and services on the exploitation of intellectual property
rights in the Community. 1
The final panel turned its attention to the effect of intellec-
tual property rights on the acquisition and abuse of market
power. Charles F. Rule, of the Washington, D.C. firm of
Covington & Burling and the former head of Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice, continued his interest in altering
the perception of hostility between intellectual property and'
competition regimes and critiqued notions that intellectual
property rights automatically or presumptively conferred un-
lawful market power within the meaning of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. Nicholas Green, Barrister with the Brick Court
Chambers, responded by addressing the less hospitable treat-
ment of intellectual property rights under Article 86 of the
Treaty of Rome. 2
The speakers each illustrated the need to understand the
relationship between intellectual property and competition
within their own systems on a comparative basis. Intellectual
property and competition policy are core components of a legal
system which cannot exist in a vacuum. Both the United
States and the European Community have to find a way to
reconcile both sets of rules and policies in a meaningful way
that implements the underlying goals and values of each sys-
tem. We are pleased to present the following special sympo-
sium issue of the Brooklyn Journal of International Law as a
step towards greater clarity and appreciation for the virtues of
tion Law, Intellectual Property Rights, and International Trade After the GAT'Fs
Uruguay Round, 20 BROOK. J. INTL L. 75 (1994).
81. David T. Keeling, Competition, Intellectual Property, and Free Movement of
Goods: A Community View, 20 BROOK. J. INVL L. 127 (1994). In London, Judge
Christopher Bellamy of the Court of First Instance spoke on this topic. See gener-
ally CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY & GRAHAM D. CHILDS, COMM1ON MARKET LAW OF COM-
PETITION 319-87 (4th ed. 1993).
82. Nicholas Green, Intellectual Property and Abuse of a Dominant Position
Under Community Law, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 141 (1994); see also NICHOLAS
GREEN, COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS AND COMPETITION LAW: PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE IN THE UK AND EEC 676-733 (1986). At Brooklyn Law School, Professor
Rosa Greaves of the University of Durham presented Mr. Green's paper.
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each system and its approaches to a difficult but important
area of the law.
